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Abstract
Surplus structure arguments famously identify elements of a theory regarded as excess
or superfluous. If there is an otherwise analogous theory that does without such elements,
a surplus structure argument prompts adopting it over the one with those elements.
Despite their prominence, the form, justification, and range of applicability of such
arguments is disputed. I provide an account of these, following Dasgupta ([2016]) for the
form, which makes plain the role of observables and observational equivalence. However,
I diverge on the justification: instead of demanding that the symmetries of the theory
relevant for surplus structure arguments be defined without recourse to any interpretation
of those theories, I suggest that the process of identifying what is observable and its
consequences for symmetries work in dialog. They settle through a reflective equilibrium
that is responsible to new experiments, arguments, and examples. Besides better aligning
with paradigmatic uses of the surplus structure argument, this position also has some
broader consequences for scope of these arguments and the relationship between
symmetry and interpretation more generally.
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1 Introduction
The process of theorizing about the physical world is difficult. This is one reason why
scientists and philosophers look to symmetries, which are held to have potential metaphysical
and epistemological significance (Brading et al. [2017], §5). For instance, suppose one can
exhibit that, according to a certain theory, a structure representing a putative feature of the
world varies under application of symmetries of the theory—it is surplus structure (Redhead
[1975], p. 88). ‘Symmetries can be a potent guide for identifying superfluous theoretical
structure’ (Ismael and van Fraassen [2003], p. 371) as, in their presence, one has reason to
believe that, ceteris paribus, the variants of this structure represent no real distinctions in the
phenomena that theory represents.
But following this guide is no trivial matter. This is because excess, surplus, or superfluous
structure in a theory does not typically announce itself. Proceeding semantically (rather than
syntactically), one must first ‘generate a set of models rich enough to embed the phenomena,
[then] attempt to simplify those models by exposing and eliminating down excess structure’
(Ismael and van Fraassen [2003], p. 390) that is idle in how the theory represents the
phenomena. Classic examples include Leibniz’s static and kinematic shift arguments against
absolute space using the Principles of Sufficient Reason and Identity of Indiscernibles,1 and
1There is a large literature on this type of argument. See, for instance, Hacking ([1975]),
Belot, Belot ([2001, 2003]), Ismael and van Fraassen ([2003]), Dasgupta ([2016]), and
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the use of U(1) gauge transformations to argue against absolute potentials in electromagnetism
(Healey [2007]).
Although many authors recognize the validity of arguments roughly of this form, there is
still some disagreement as to what that form is, and its own range of validity (Belot [2013]).
Dasgupta ([2016]) has however recently brought new analytical focus to the structure of this
argument and what it entails for the nature of symmetry thus invoked.2 He argues that there
are two ways in which the surplus structure argument involves epistemic considerations. First,
they license inferences from the undetectability of surplus structure in a theory to an
observationally equivalent theory, ceteris paribus, in which that structure does not represent
any real feature of the world. Second, antecedent analysis of which worldly features are
detectable through our faculties of perceptions, prior to and independent of the metaphysics of
the theories to which it is applied, must justify what get to count as symmetries of observables.
I agree with the first but part ways with him on the second. In particular, while I agree that
it is an Occamist norm to which the surplus structure argument appeals, I also point out
several unmet obstacles to defining observational equivalence prior to any interpretation of the
theories to which it is supposed to apply. Nevertheless, since we agree on the form of the
surplus structure argument, his essay will be a touchstone for motivating my own account in
section 4: roughly, that observability in and interpretation of theories proceed hand-in-hand
through a process of reflective equilibrium. This account also fits better the historically
paradigmatic uses of the surplus structure argument, and how scientists responded to cases in
which what was previously thought to be surplus structure was not.
In the sequel, after developing some elementary formal tools for describing symmetry in
section 2, I proceed to recount and critically evaluate Dasgupta’s twofold epistemic proposal
in section 3. I present my alternative, reflective equilibrium proposal for the relationship
between interpretation and observation in section 4, including sketches of how it better
references cited therein.
2As I remark tangentially at some points (and especially in footnotes 7 and 8), Dasgupta’s
position is (despite his asseverations to the contrary) very similar to that of Ismael and van
Fraassen ([2003]). Nevertheless his presentation deserves the touchstone honor (as I say in
what follows) for it is much more perspicuous on the present items of discussion.
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coheres with historical examples. I conclude in section 5 with some positive remarks (like
those of Dasgupta ([2016])) on the scope of surplus structure arguments against the skepticism
of Belot ([2013]): the arguments do have a generally valid form, once we are attentive to
certain details about different types of symmetry and the role of isomorphism vis-á-vis
representational capacities.
2 Symmetries of Models and Theories
Let S be the space of models (states) of a physical system characterizing some phenomenon
of interest. They represent the various states of affairs in which the system could be, according
to some theory. The states have various properties, and the values of those properties partition
S into equivalence classes. For example, if X is a Boolean property defined for all
models—i.e., it either obtains or does not for any particular state—then it induces an
equivalence relation ≡X on S whose two equivalence classes consist, respectively, of those
models of S in which X obtains, and those in which it does not. If X is a quantitative property
defined for all models—e.g., like mass, it takes on values in the non-negative real
numbers—then ≡X will induce as many equivalence classes on S as there are values of X that
obtain in at least one model of S. Observable properties, such as relative distances and times,
although not distinguished formally from non-observable ones, would be examples. Note
while many properties of interest are defined for all models, some are not: considering matter
fields in Newtonian and Galilean spacetimes, only in the former do the fields have a
well-defined state of absolute motion.
There may also be relevant relations (or other structures) defined on S, too, besides the
equivalence relations induced from properties defined thereon. Here I only focus on the case
of a binary relations ∼ of observational indistinguishability. There may be more than one such
relation, as they may be indexed to particular theoretical accounts of and technological
capabilities for measurement. For the purposes of this essay, I shall assume that these relations
are reflexive and symmetric, but (unlike an equivalence relation) not transitive.3 In other
3These assumptions may need to be weakened in some examples (Tversky [1977], Fletcher
[forthcoming]), but doing so doesn’t materially affect the details of my arguments in sections
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words, any model represents a state of affairs observationally indistinguishable to itself, and if
one is observationally indistinguishable from another, the other is from the one. Sorites-like
considerations illuminate they are not transitive: shades of a color may be to the typical naked
eye observationally indistinguishable from those a bit darker and brighter, but transitivity
would then imply that the blackest shade would be indistinguishable from the whitest.
Next, let T be the set of bijective functions on S, called transformations of S. Some of the
transformations preserve properties, relations, or other structures on S, and these will be
called symmetries. But it is important to distinguish a symmetry by which structures it
preserves. Given an equivalence relation ≡ on S, T is an ≡-symmetry of S just when for any
s ∈ S, s ≡ T (s). An ≡-symmetry preserves the valuation of the property inducing the
equivalence relation ≡. Similarly, given any relation ∼ of observational indistinguishability on
S, T is a ∼-symmetry of S just when for any s ∈ S, s ∼ T (s). A ∼-symmetry preserves
enough features of a model that the transformed model is observationally indistinguishable
from the un-transformed model.
When all the models in S have certain features in common, sometimes one can describe a
transformation on these features that induces a transformation on the models, which one can
then consider as a candidate symmetry. One way this can happen is if there is a property
assignment that is well-defined for all models. In the Boolean case, a mapping that switches
the valuations ‘true’ and ‘false’ will induce a map on the models that send any model to one
that is the same but with the valuation of that property switched. In the quantitative case, a
bijection—really, an isomorphism—of the valuation space induces a map on the models in the
same way. For instance, in Newtonian spacetime models, this would include any velocity shift
of the absolute rest frame. Note, however, that there must be for each model in S a
well-defined model that is the image of the putatively induced map. Shifting the velocity of
the absolute rest frame in Galilean spacetime is not well-defined.
Another (compatible) way to induce a transformation on the models arises when the models
assign properties to the same set of objects. A permutation of those objects then induces a
transformation on the models. Often, one desires such a permutation to also preserve any
3 and 4.
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special structure these individuals may have. For instance, consider the collection of models
that use a common fixed smooth manifold to represent spacetime: each of its models assigns
various properties to individual events (points) and collections thereof. Diffeomorphisms of
the smooth manifold permute the events while preserving its smooth structure. Such maps
induce pushforward maps that are then candidates for being isometries, or some other type of
structure-preserving mapping (symmetry).
3 Dasgupta’s Epistemic Proposal
3.1 The Account
Having presented some elementary formal apparatus to make symmetry reasoning with
physical theories more precise, I can proceed to form of the surplus structure argument.
Dasgupta ([2016], p. 853) in particular reconstructs it as follows:
(1) Laws L are the complete laws of motion governing our world.
(2) Feature X is variant in L.
(3) Therefore, X is undetectable (from (1) and (2)).
(C) Therefore, X is not real (from (3) and the Occamist norm that
we dispense with undetectable structure).
Some explication of Dasgupta’s terms is in order. First, for present purposes one may think of
the laws L as selecting a subset of the state space S of the universe (cf. ‘our world’) that count
as dynamically possible, or more generally and charitably, as nomologically possible.4 (Thus
the state space may be said to represent mere metaphysical or kinematic possibility.) Because
L partitions the states into those satisfying the laws and those not, it induces an equivalence
relation ≡L on S. A feature X is just a property, and the values that it takes on different
elements S also partition them into equivalence classes corresponding to the induced
equivalence relation ≡X. For X to be variant in the laws is to say that there is an ≡L-symmetry*
transformation on S that is not an ≡X-symmetry* transformation on S. Here, a symmetry* is a
4Not all (even physical) laws need be laws of motion. This makes no difference in what
follows, however.
6
special type of symmetry in the sense I have defined in section 2, one that is induced from a
transformation on properties or individuals,5 and is also a symmetry of all
observational/detectable features (Dasgupta [2016], §6.4), understood as equivalence relations
in the same way as X. The intermediate conclusion, (3), follows because if X were detectable,
it would be preserved by a symmetry*, but this would be just to deny the premise (2).
I will return to Dasgupta’s account of symmetry* shortly, but first I complete the exegesis of
his account of the form of the symmetry argument against surplus structure. In the first place,
‘If we can show that the feature [X] is undetectable, then we will have shown that we do not
(and cannot) have empirical evidence in the form of observations or measurements of it’
(Dasgupta [2016], p. 854).6 Then one can infer to a theory with the same laws L but in which
X does not mark out any real differences, provided that ‘we have the alternative theory in hand
and have shown that all else is equal’ (Dasgupta [2016], p. 854), in particular, that ‘the
theories that dispense with the feature [X] do not have [additional] other epistemic vices’
(Dasgupta [2016], p. 854) such as inelegance or complexity.7 Thus the inference to (C) is only
based on ceteris paribus considerations. But there are clear cases where it does apply: without
Galilean spacetime known to him, Newton was right not to reject the reality of absolute space
in the face of Leibniz’s static and kinematic shift arguments, but now that this option is
known, one should so reject it.
5I’ve expressed this clause as a disjunction since Dasgupta ([2016], p. 858n27) doesn’t
seem to distinguish between transformations on properties from those on individuals; what
matters to him is that such transformations are ‘generated by a recipe’ (Dasgupta [2016],
p. 858).
6Actually, Dasgupta ([2016], p. 874) restricts attention to undetectable properties that are
also not defined in terms of detectable properties, because one does have empirical reason to
believe those are real—namely, whatever reason one has for believing in the reality of the
detectable properties in terms of which they are defined. Technically, this only solves the
problem for properties that are explicitly so-defined, so an extension to implicitly defined
properties would make sense.
7See also Ismael and van Fraassen ([2003], p. 390–1) for a similar observation on the
scope of this sort of symmetry argument against surplus structure.
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It should be clear that symmetry* cannot be weakened to symmetry (sans asterisk), which is
only formally defined, for there would then be no necessary connection between L-symmetry
and undetectability, rendering the inference to the intermediate conclusion (3) invalid.
Moreover, Dasgupta ([2016], p. 867, emph. add.) insists that
observational equivalence must be defined in epistemic terms that do not depend
on the underlying metaphysics, such that we can be in a position to know whether
two structures [i.e., models] are observationally equivalent prior to knowing
anything (via symmetry-to-reality reasoning [i.e., the type of argument form
under discussion]) about the metaphysics of our world.
This is because otherwise one is led to an inferential circularity—a circularity of
justification—in the symmetry argument against (the reality of) surplus structure, as
we often use premises about symmetries[*] in order to work out which physical
features fix the [observational] data, so we cannot at the same time define
symmetries[*] to be those operations that preserve features that fix the
[observational] data (Dasgupta [2016], p. 865)
if we wish to maintain the general validity of this argument (if only on the ceteris paribus
conditions discussed above) . Consequently, these arguments broach ‘considerations that
reach into the philosophy of perception and mind’ (Dasgupta [2016], p. 875).8
8Pace Dasgupta ([2016], p. 867), his epistemic definition of (what I am here calling)
symmetry* is essentially the same as that of Ismael and van Fraassen ([2003], p. 379, emph.
orig.), namely, that the symmetries (unstarred!) at play are those ‘that also preserve all
qualitative features of every model’ of the theory, i.e., are L-symmetries, where qualitative
features of a model are that those ‘which characterize that [model], and are directly accessible
to us through perception’ (Ismael and van Fraassen [2003], p. 375). Dasgupta takes Ismael
and van Fraassen to be defining qualitative features from symmetries, but they are quite
explicit that they are not doing so: their definition of qualitative features (Ismael and van
Fraassen [2003], p. 375) comes before their definition of symmetry (Ismael and van Fraassen
[2003], p. 378–9) and does not invoke it.
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It would be a surprising conclusion that implicates more commonplace understandings of
symmetry, including essentially all those applied by physicists, as being insufficiently attentive
to the nature of perception. But what positive proposal does Dasgupta make? He associates
with each model s ∈ S and each context i within the model—this is not defined precisely, but
should be something like a frame of reference—that determines a class of observation
sentences deemed ‘correct,’ suggesting that ‘one’s grasp of observations sentences . . . allows
one to determine their correctness-conditions in each kind of world, including what kinds of
indices correctness relativizes to’ (Dasgupta [2016], p. 870). Any transformation on S induces
a transformation on the index i, which in turn induces a transformation on the set of
observation sentences. If this induced transformation on the observation sentences is the
identity for all models and all indices, it is said to preserve the observation sentences. Then an
≡L-symmetry* is one that preserves not only L but also the observation sentences. Crucially,
once one grasps the contextualized correctness-conditions ‘it is then an a priori matter
whether the transformation is a symmetry of the law’ (Dasgupta [2016], p. 870), one that does
not presuppose any underlying metaphysics.
3.2 The Objections
However, there are a number of unaddressed problems with this suggestion that make the class
of symmetries* too small. I’ll set aside concerns about underspecification of the indexing
proposal, and the usual objections that observation sentences are theory-laden (Bogen [2017])
and so do in fact presuppose metaphysical claims on which Dasgupta wishes to remain
agnostic.9 Instead I’ll focus on the lack of constraints on both what the observation sentences
and the models under consideration can be. Consider a putative observation sentence, ‘My
only firecracker went off at event p.’ Now, any nontrivial spacetime transformation T , such as
9There’s the additional, related issue that the laws L may well presuppose spacetime
structure, so that determining whether a transformation is an ≡L-symmetry* also presupposes
settling certain of the claims on which Dasgupta again wishes to be agnostic. He seems to
acknowledge this point (Dasgupta [2016], p. 848n14) but sees it as a ‘distraction’ from his
main argument.
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a diffeomorphism on the spacetime smooth base manifold, will map some spacetime point to
another not identical to it, e.g., p 7→ q , p. So if the sentence is acceptable for s, it will not be
so for T (s). No spacetime transformation that does not act as the identity on p can thus be a
symmetry*, regardless of the laws, if such sentences can be countenanced as acceptable
observation sentences.
Now, it is precisely the moral of the hole argument in general relativity (on one reading, at
least) that such transformations induce no change because they induce no observable change,
as Dasgupta ([2016], p. 840–1) himself describes. But that is exactly the sort of argument of
which he cannot avail himself. It doesn’t seem metaphysically impossible that there could be
beings who could observe the essence of spacetime events themselves. How can such
observation sentences therefore be ruled out as being acceptable on epistemological grounds,
without already employing some assumptions about what the terms in the sentences
represent? Without ruling them out, it becomes difficult to find many of the symmetries* we
antecedently supposed were present in theories we already use.
It isn’t clear to me that they can be ruled out a priori, but suppose they could. There is still
the problem that even for observation sentences that don’t refer to seemingly unobservable
features, the class of models will be too wide to allow for any nontrivial symmetries*.
Because a symmetry* must preserve observation sentences for all models, a very wide class of
models makes it more difficult for a transformation to be a symmetry*.
I have in mind in particular two classes that will be too wide. One class consists of models
only on some of which certain properties are well defined, or which do note predicate features
of the same individuals. The result is that it is even harder to find transformations—candidates
for symmetries*—that are induced from transformations on properties of models or on the
individuals these models describe. Such classes are not entirely chimerical, for they can result
from juxtaposing the models of a theory with those that are the result of expurging surplus
structure therefrom! To take two familiar examples with properties: static shifts that move the
center of the world are well-defined for Aristotelian spacetime, but not for Newtonian ones;
kinematic shifts that adjust absolute velocities uniformly are well-defined for Newtonian
spacetime, but not for Galilean ones. And two slightly more esoteric examples that seem
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nevertheless to be physically or metaphysically possible, in principle: a parity transformation
that inverts left and right is well-defined on orientable spacetimes but not on non-orientable
ones; spatial translations and rotations may not be defined for spacetimes with unusual
topologies. Such transformations cannot count as symmetries*, even of the models we would
otherwise regard as having a symmetry, because the transformations do not (indeed, cannot)
act on the whole set of models.
For each putative symmetry*, I reckon that one can find models to add to S for which it is
ill-defined—the models defined by the quotient of models under the putative symmetry*. One
might argue that such putative symmetries* should be extended to act as the identity on these
new models, but that would violate Dasgupta’s resolve to define transformations on models in
terms of transformations on their properties or individuals. With no property of a particular
sort to be had for a certain model, the transformation thereby generated cannot have that
model in its domain.
The other class of models I have in mind consists of those whose correct observation
sentences are distinct from any other (even with index structure accounted for). These
describe states that may be observationally quite like our own but whose apparent symmetries
are in fact only approximate. This is entirely compatible with our observational evidence, and
so it is entirely possible that ‘perhaps one would find that none of the symmetries [that our
theories attribute to Nature] is really exact if our observational/experimental capabilities were
sufficiently improved’ (Sundermeyer 2014, p. 12). By definition, then, no transformation on S
other than the identity will induce a transformation on their observation sentences that
preserves them for every context i,10 for even if our present coarse means of observation
renders the states indistinguishable, there will be some possible finer means that will resolve
them. It will not help to modify Dasgupta’s definition of symmetry* to range only over the
present context i, for observational indistinguishability is not an equivalence relation as is also
required by the definition: if states differ in continuous degrees, then the transitive closure of
observationally indistinguishable states would include observationally distinguishable states.
10In the terminology of Caulton ([2015]) that I discuss below, these are models from a
theory where identity is the only analytic symmetry.
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Thus, when models without any symmetries are present in S, there will be no symmetries*.
To be clear, the argument is not that there is something wrong with reasoning that ‘which
physical features we should believe are real depends on which systems are observationally
equivalent’ (Dasgupta 2016, p. 872)—on this point I essentially agree with Dasgupta. Rather,
the point is that the existence of states whose observation sentences are subtly distinct from
those of any other states confutes the proposed definition of symmetry* that would account for
its use in surplus structure arguments.
Finally, one could also raise objections to the descriptive accuracy of Dasgupta’s
epistemology-first approach to paradigms of the surplus structure argument from the history of
physics. I will discuss these, however, in the course of extolling the virtues of my own account
of the surplus structure argument in section 4.
4 A More Naturalistic and Historically Descriptive Proposal
4.1 The Account
Perhaps there is some other way of amending Dasgupta’s proposal, but I shall not pursue it.
For a methodological naturalist such as myself, the project of a priori epistemology and
philosophy of perception is on just as dubious grounds as a priori metaphysics (Papineau
[2016], §2). But regardless of one’s methodological proclivities, and the status of my above
objections, there is a different positive approach worth articulating. Instead of insisting on a
foundationalist epistemology for the role of symmetries in surplus structure
arguments—working out, in other words, exactly what is observable before using those facts
to determine one’s metaphysics—one can take a more coherentist approach and allow some
metaphysics to influence what states and observations are possible (Olsson [2017]). For, my
objections to Dasgupta’s proposal above all turned on how the foundational epistemological
purist has their hands tied behind their back in trying to constrain possible states and
observation statements. Of course, it’s important that any circles of justification in such an
approach are not wound too tightly, but this does not present a significant problem: much of
the metaphysics that one needs does not (pace Dasgupta ([2016], p. 864)) arise from such
arguments.
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The details employ a simple application of reflective equilibrium, inspired by a proposal for
the interpretation of theories with symmetry by Caulton ([2015]).11 One first proposes a
plausible and empirically adequate (or nearly enough so) theory of a system of interest, which
includes states, the observable properties thereof, and how these formal objects represent
physical objects and properties. That theory’s specification of its observable properties
induces, for each one, an equivalence relation on its collection of states according to sameness
of observable property. This in turn determines some symmetries, divided into the analytic
and synthetic. What’s important for present purposes are the analytic symmetries, which are
those that preserve all the observable property equivalence relations.12
Second, one tests both that the class of observable properties is wide enough to account for
the plethora of experience within the theory’s scope, and that it is narrow enough that it doesn’t
include properties whose values don’t bear on the empirical (or other, e.g., explanatory) value
of the theory. This can include the application of surplus structure arguments for the function
of narrowing, but it can also include empirical experimentation for the function of widening
and of changing the possible states under consideration. (I’ll give some examples below.)
Eliminating states or observable properties can introduce more analytic symmetries, while
introducing new states or observables can eliminate some analytic symmetries.
Third, one decides whether, ceteris paribus, one should identify or make synonymous (i.e.,
regard as equivalent) the remaining states related by an analytic symmetry, thereby
eliminating the properties that those states did not have in common. Caulton ([2015], pp, 156,
11But there are differences. Caulton’s proposal is not itself of a coherentist flavor nor does
he advocate for reflective equilibrium; conversely, he asserts that his process leads to a unique
interpretation, while I make no such claim.
12Thus analytic symmetries are close to what Ismael and van Fraassen ([2003], p. 380) call
trivial symmetries, but they insist that the observable properties should be understood as those
they call qualitative, which are those ‘that can characterize a situation, distinguishable by even
a gross discrimination of colour, texture, smell, and so on’ (Ismael and van Fraassen [2003],
p. 376). By contrast, Caulton ([2015], p. 150) insists that ‘which symmetries count as analytic
and which count as synthetic will hand on the details of this representation relation, and vice
versa’. On this issue my proposal aligns with Caulton’s.
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160) recommends quotienting the models by the analytic symmetry equivalence classes
(insofar as this does not reduce empirical adequacy), but the quotient operation does not
always obviously yield a theory with practically feasible predictions or explanations of
phenomena, as is arguably the case for holonomy interpretation of the Aharanov-Bohm effect
Healey ([2007], pp. 120–2).13 However, Dewar ([2017]) has recently pointed out that this is
not the only option: instead of modifying the models, one can modify their isomorphisms,
regarding analytic symmetries as isomorphisms. This works because isomorphic models have
the same representational capacities: they may represent the same physical states equally well
(Fletcher [2018]).
Which technique—quotienting models or adding isomorphisms—one choses depends on
balancing the interpretative and explanatory considerations at hand. For example, insofar as
one is less sure that a certain symmetry is exact, rather than approximate and liable to
considered an accident from the vantage of future theory, one might lean towards adding
isomorphisms, as it will be easier to ‘undo’ in future developments if it turns out to be so. But
if one is sure, and doing so does not appreciably reduce the explanatory resources of the
theory. It may even be advisable to take a pluralist stance towards these options, recognizing
that they depend on weighing various factors that may not receive intersubjective agreement in
the relevant expect community. Indeed, in the fourth step one returns to step two as new
theoretical arguments and experimental facts about observables and their representation arises.
13Caulton ([2015], pp. 154) acknowledges that his proposal does not settle matters of
interpretation that are hyperintensional, e.g., explanatory features of theory, but suggests that
this is less relevant because the explanatory goals of physicists are distinct from the
interpretive goals of philosophers (Caulton [2015], p. 161). I am not not so sure why ontology,
interpretation, and explanation can be so cleanly separated. But in any case, as Dewar ([2017],
pp. 12–14) points out, quotienting does seem to eliminate certain explanatory resources, such
as those for showing why invariant quantities satisfy certain constraints, on which Caulton’s
proposal is not neutral. The point is not that one should never quotient, but rather that there are
more constraints and considerations than empirical adequacy at hand.
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4.2 The Objections, Met
Despite how philosophers may present the individual steps and arguments of this process in
potted histories of, e.g., the transition from Newtonian to Galilean spacetime, each is usually a
significant intellectual accomplishment. Ismael and van Fraassen ([2003], p. 372) do
acknowledge this for steps two and three: ‘A theory is usually around long before we know
whether it contains unmeasurable quantities, and which quantities those might be. The process
of identifying unmeasurable quantities, i.e. of smoking them out of their hidden places in the
theoretical apparatus, is long, hard, and highly non-trivial.’ But it is also so for step four.
That’s to say, it was significant both for Leibniz to develop his shift arguments, based on the
identity of indiscernibles, against absolute space, time, and motion, and for Newton to
develop his bucket and globes arguments for some sort of absolute time and motion. The
former deploys a surplus structure argument (steps two and three), while the latter inserts a
new argument that leads one (through step four) to re-evaluate the ceteris paribus clauses of
that argument. I thus contend my proposal better aligns with scientific practice and the actual
use of surplus structure arguments deemed successful through history. Because the process of
reflection can accommodate new evidence and arguments, it also better accommodates how
our judgments about what is observable and what symmetries are exact and what others
merely approximate change over time, just as they have in fact. Accordingly, it does not
require any assumptions about the completeness of the laws invoked, only their empirical
adequacy for a certain domain of application (insofar as even this can be achieved), in contrast
to Dasgupta’s reconstruction.
It will help to illustrate this in the course of responding to a potential objection from
Dasgupta ([2016], pp. 864–5). The objection reiterates the concern that ‘we discover which
physical features fix the data by engaging in symmetry reasoning’ (Dasgupta [2016], p. 864),
so that any determination of observables prior to determination of the (analytic) symmetries
would preclude certain of these symmetries, e.g., ones we have actually adopted in the
transition from pre-relativistic spacetime theories to the special theory of relativity.14 This is to
14Dasgupta ([2016], p. 864) offers the concrete example of spatial distance: ‘it is crucial
that this is not counted as something that fixes the data, else Lorentz transformations will not
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implicitly deny, in other words, the possibility of the fourth step in the iterative process of
reflective equilibrium.
But the most cursory examination of historical and experimental examples involving
symmetry reasoning about observational equivalence reveals a quite different conclusion. Any
theory of empirical phenomena must interface with models of experiments, for which the
theory’s symmetries make predictions on the possible existence or non-existence of putative
observables. For example,
When we say [that there is] right-left symmetry, we imply that it is impossible to
observe an absolute difference between right and left. . . . Indeed, all symmetries
are based on the assumption that it is impossible to observe certain basic
quantities, which we shall call ‘nonobservables.’ Conversely whenever a
nonobservable becomes an observable, we have a symmetry violation. (Lee
[1988], p. 6)
In other words, any (analytic) symmetry or lack thereof implies constraints or freedoms,
respectively, in the phenomena to be observed. In the case to which Lee alludes, before 1956
physicists commonly supposed parity symmetry to hold. This predicts no observable absolute
difference between right and left as predicted in physical theory, whereas in 1956 C. S. Wu
and her colleagues discovered such a difference in beta decay experiments of cobalt-60 (Lee
[1988], pp. 4, 11)!
count as symmetries of the STR!’ However, the example is flawed: (proper) spatial distances
do not vary under Lorentz transformations. Perhaps Dasgupta had in mind the phenomenon of
length contraction, but that is an effect arising from coordinate re-descriptions (passive
transformations) of the same events, which he denies is the subject of his analysis (Dasgupta
[2016], p. 839n2). Alternatively, he could have had in mind two situations in which an object
and its counterpart are in different states of motion relative to an observer (and its
counterpart): the observer would indeed judge them to be of different sizes, for reasons
analogous to those for length contraction. However, these two situations are not related by a
Lorentz transformation—or any symmetry of Minkowski spacetime—at all, as only the
object, not the observer, is boosted in one situation respect to the other.
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Similarly, the relationisms of Cartesian and Leibnizian physics eliminated any observable
absolute motions, but this then left a gap in explaining the inertial effects in Newton’s bucket
and globes thought experiments. And in the transition to special relativity, the lack of full
spacetime Poincaré symmetry made the non-observability of the aether wind puzzling. The ad
hoc FitzGerald contraction hypothesis notwithstanding, the transition to special relativity
finally explained and settled the issue satisfactorily (Janssen [2002]). Finally, while assuming
Poincaré symmetry in special relativity entails the existences of nonobservables—properties
invariant under their transformations—this did not somehow preclude the development of
general relativity, in which Poincaré symmetry does not hold. This list could be widened
considerably.
5 The Scope of Surplus Structure Arguments
Although I agree with Dasgupta about the form of the surplus structure argument—in
particular, that it turns on the nonobservable status of the structure to be marked as
superfluous—I differ from him in the justification that we should (and do) give to which
properties are observable. Rather than try to determine what is observable prior to any theory,
which he calls an ‘epistemic’ definition of symmetry, I suggested instead a process of
conjecture, argument, experiment, and reflective equilibrium that also better captures the
historical vicissitudes of observability. In this last section I will draw out one further
consequence of this position.
Dasgupta ([2016], p. 876) describes how his account renews optimism about the general
validity of surplus structure arguments in the face of the skepticism of Belot ([2013]), which
he attributes to his ‘epistemic’ definition of symmetry. However, the problems with
Dasgupta’s positive account for allowing for enough symmetries* and its misalignment with
historical exemplars of the surplus structure argument, discussed in sections 3 and 4,
respectively, would give the skeptic further pause. But because my account provides a
different account of the justification for what counts as observable while sharing the same
form for the surplus structure argument, it is in a better position to renew optimism about that
argument’s general validity.
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To show this requires revealing in more detail the grounds for Belot’s pessimism and how
my account can be responsive to it. Belot ([2013], p. 319) begins with the following two
principles that he see implicit in philosophical commentary on symmetries:
D1 The symmetries of a classical theory are those transformations that map solution of the
theory’s equation of motion to solutions of the theory’s equation of motion.
D2 Two solutions of a classical theory’s equation of motion are related by a symmetry if and
only if they are physically equivalent, in the sense that they are equally well- or
ill-suited to represent any particular physical situation.
D1 is intended as a formal definition of symmetry, while D2 is intended to connect that notion
of symmetry with the interpretation of a physical theory. Combined, they would yield some
way in which formalism and interpretation constrain each other. But literally understood, they
imply immediately that any two models of a classical theory have the same representational
capacities, i.e., they ‘are equally well- or ill-suited to represent any particular physical
situation.’ Since most theories aim to describe more than singular phenomena, this is an
unwelcome conclusion.
The significance of this for the surplus structure argument is that, at least in special cases,
that argument may seem to involve commitments to D1 and D2, or principles near enough
thereto (Belot [2013], p. 319n3). Take the example of a kinematic shift in a Galilean
spacetime: it maps models to models, and does not alter spacetime structure, which
determines the representational capacities of a Galilean spacetime model. On the other hand, a
kinematic shift applied to a Newtonian spacetime shifts the absolute velocities of all matter
and fields represented therein. Because of this mismatch between its symmetries and its
representational capacities, Newtonian spacetime might be said to be postulating excess
spacetime structure. But in light of the unwelcome conclusion above, this cannot be a
generally valid argument form, and Belot ([2013], p. 333) places most of blame on D1 as a
definition of symmetry: ‘I leave it as a challenge to the reader to identify a general and
interesting formal notion of symmetry [i.e., a rendering of D1] that renders D2 true.’
Under (my reading of) Dasgupta’s reconstruction, however, the surplus structure argument
proceeds rather differently. In the first place, I believe it deserves emphasizing more than those
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writing before me that symmetries come in many types according to which equivalence
relation (or otherwise) they preserve. It is important to distinguish them according to what
exactly they preserve, let one fall into fallacies of equivocation. And that equivocation can
leads to the unwelcome conclusion above.
The symmetries involved in the surplus structure argument are symmetries*: not just
symmetries of the laws (≡L-symmetries), which is what is specified in D1, but also
symmetries of the (exact) observable properties of the models involved. The inference to
deeming certain features superfluous runs not through a thesis like D2 about representational
capacities, but rather through an Occamist norm about minimizing ontological commitments,
ceteris pariubs. Rather than using something like D2 as a premise in the argument, the surplus
structure argument’s conclusion motivates adopting a theory in which the symmetries* relate
models that are closer to being physically equivalent.
However, this is not to say, exactly, that D2 is the conclusion or a regulative ideal of the
surplus structure argument, even with the ‘symmetry’ mentioned in D2 replaced by
‘symmetry*’. The reason is that the biconditional does not hold for the same notion of
‘symmetry’ in both directions. Two models of a theory may be related by a symmetry* but not
have the same representational capacities if the features variant between the models are not
observational. Of course, applying a surplus structure argument to a theory with such models
may motivate adopting instead a theory in which those models’ respective counterparts do
have the same representational capacities, but this is besides the point when it comes to the
interpretation of the theory at hand. Being related by a symmetry* thus provides only a
necessary condition for physical equivalence:
D2* Two models of a theory are related by a symmetry* if they have the same
representational capacities (i.e., are physically equivalent).
For, if two models have the same representational capacities, they must be capable of
representing in particular the same observable phenomena, so they may be related by some
transformation that maps the one into the other.
Is there a sufficient symmetry-like condition for physical equivalence? I shall adopt the
suggestion of Fletcher ([2018]), that there is:
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D2’ Two models of a theory are related by an isomorphism only if they have the same
representational capacities (i.e., are physically equivalent).
In contrast with symmetry*, which is not an entirely formal notion due to its reference to
observable equivalence, isomorphism is a formal feature of a category of mathematical
models. Isomorphisms are maps between models that witness an equivalence between those
models, as elements of that category. For example, two smooth manifolds are isomophic
(diffeomorphic) when, as smooth manifolds, they are equivalent: among the mathematical
properties of smooth manifolds, they have the same. So, using models from a particular
mathematical category as members of that category to represent physical states of affairs
entails that they have the same representational capacities, for otherwise they would not be
models as members of that category.
In contrast with symmetry*, Fletcher ([2018]) has argued in particular that isomorphism is
not a necessary condition for physical equivalence. The very existence of theories with surplus
structure is proof of that, for that variant structure renders the models non-isomorphic even if
it does no representational work. Even if such theories are deficient in some way, leading us to
change the category by adding isomorphisms as Dewar ([2017]) suggests, it does not mean
that they cannot be interpreted, and in any case, the ceteris paribus condition in that argument
warns us that other (e.g., explanatory or pragmatic) considerations may void the attribution of
superfluousness.
Although Belot’s pessimism arose from fixing D2 and searching for a plausible analog of
D1, I have suggested that D2 be replaced by two different principles that provide distinct
conditions (one necessary, D2*, and the other sufficient, D2’,) for physical equivalence. He
has speculated along these lines: ‘Of course, some interesting weaker relative of D2 might be
true’ Belot ([2013], p. 334n56). But he did not speculate that the analog of D1 that played a
role in the surplus structure argument would not contain a formally defined notion of
symmetry at all. Rightfully, it should involve a complicated interplay between theory,
experiment, and representation, balanced continually through reflective equilibrium (as
described in section 4). As Dasgupta ([2016], pp. 874, 876) warned, there seems to be no
purely formal notion of symmetry that preserves the validity of the argument. Belot’s
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pessimism is warranted only when one demands that there be some such notion.
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